Derrida’s reading of Deleuze’s “Difference and Repetition” argues that Man’s capacity for stupidity, or bêtise (which signifies stupidity, bestiality, and dumbness) is what separates him from the animals. It is stupidity, bestiality, that makes us different from animals: bêtise implies not an error, not a bad judgement, but rather an inability to judge”. Deleuze writes “bêtise is human and not bestial, not animal”, in a similar fashion to Lacan’s argument that bestiality relates only to humans, since, paradoxically, it cannot be applied to animals. Derrida claims that Deleuze here does not break free from “the hegemonic tradition from Descartes to Levinas, including Lacan and Heidegger”. Derrida suggests that the idea of the unconscious, which Deleuze cannot disqualify, dissolves the boundaries between the animal and human that Deleuze had attempted to erect with “stupidity”.