Quando morrer, que seja assim

«Provecto dos anos, uma tarde, ergueu-se do borralho e saiu a porta para fora, amparado ao porretinho de marmeleiro. Andava há dias a chocar a morte e deixaram-no ir, que era relapso a prevenções e cuidados. Sentou-se no poial de pedra, que servia de amassadoiro do linho. Com mão incerta aconchegou as abas da capucha contra os joelhos regélidos. Nevara, cordejara, e as árvores, com o sincelo, estalavam ao peso das candeias. António Malhadinhas fechou os olhos à semelhança do romeiro que torna de Santiago, farto de correr léguas, ver terras, passar pontes e vaus, enxotar cães que arremetem ameaçadores de currais e quintãs, e adormece a sonhar com o céu num recosto do caminho. Vergou brandamente a cabeça para o peito, ao tempo que os dedos lhe pendiam para o chão como vagens maduras. E – o Justo Juiz lhe perdoe as facadas que as não deu em nenhum santo – nem se sentiu a atravessar as alpoldras duma margem para a outra do negro rio».

– Aquilino Ribeiro, final de “O Malhadinhas”.

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“Se Aquilino Ribeiro fosse vivo, seria ele a receber o prémio Nobel da literatura.”

– José Saramago, ao receber o Nobel.

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A solas com su risa

«…había un policía en las cercanías, fui hacia él y le pregunté, sin aliento, cuál era el camino. Sonrió y dijo:
-¿Por mí quieres conocer el camino?
– Sí – dije -, ya que no puedo hallarlo por mí mismo.
– Renuncia, renuncia – dijo, y se volvió con gran ímpetu, como las gentes que quieren quedarse a solas con su risa.»

– Kafka

A subjectless transcendental field

«É estranho que se tenha podido fundar a Estética (como ciência do sensível) no que pode ser representado no sensível. É verdade que não é melhor o procedimento inverso, que subtrai da representação o puro sensível e tenta determiná-lo como aquilo que resta, uma vez despida a representação (um fluxo contraditório, por exemplo, uma rapsódia de sensações). Na verdade, o empirismo se torna transcendental e a Estética se torna uma disciplina apodítica quando apreendemos diretamente no sensível o que só pode ser sentido, o próprio ser do sensível: a diferença, a diferença de potencial, a diferença de intensidade como razão do diverso qualitativo. É na diferença que o fenômeno fulgura, que se explica como signo: e é nela que o movimento se produz como “efeito”. (…) No eterno retorno, a caos-errância opõe-se à coerência da representação; ela exclui a coerência de um sujeito que se representa, bem como de um objeto representado. A repetição opõe-se à representação (…). A repetição é o ser informal de todas as diferenças, a potência informal do fundo que leva cada coisa a esta “forma” extrema em que sua representação se desfaz. O díspar é o último elemento da repetição que se opõe à identidade da representação. O círculo do eterno retorno, o da diferença e da repetição (que desfaz o do idêntico e do contraditório), é um círculo tortuoso que só diz o Mesmo daquilo que difere. O poeta Blood exprime a profissão de fé do empirismo transcendental como verdadeira Estética: “A natureza é contingente, excessiva e mística, essencialmente… As coisas são estranhas… O universo é selvagem… O mesmo só retorna para trazer o diferente. O lento movimento circular que o gravador executa adquire apenas a espessura de um fio de cabelo. Mas a diferença se distribui na curva inteira, nunca exatamente adequada”31.»

– Deleuze, “Diferença e Repetição”, “A diferença em si mesma”.

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«VII

A decisive step remains to be taken. By itself the speaking subject, in the strict sense of the term, is incapable of absolutely grounding the ideal Objectivity of sense . Oral communication (i.e. , present , im­mediate , and synchronic communication) among the protogeometers is not sufficient to give ideal objectivities their “continuing to be” and “persisting factual existence, ” thanks to which they perdure “even dur­ing periods in which the inventor and his fellows are no longer awake to such an exchange or even, more universally, no longer alive .” To be absolutely ideal, the object must still be freed of every tie with an actually present subjectivity in general . Therefore, it must perdure “even when no one has actualized it in evidence” (164 [modified]) . Speech [langage oral] has freed the object of individual subjectivity but leaves it bound to its beginning and to the synchrony of an exchange within the institutive community.
The possibility of writing will assure the absolute traditionalization of the object , its absolute ideal Objectivity-i .e. , the purity of its relation to a universal transcendental subjectivity. Writing will do this by eman­cipating sense from its actually present evidence for a real subject and from its present circulation within a determined community . “The decisive function of written expression, of expression which documents, is that it makes communication possible without immediate or mediate address; it is, so to speak, communication become virtual” (164 [modified]) .
That virtuality, moreover, is an ambiguous value: it simultaneously makes passivity, forgetfulness, and all the phenomena of crisis possible .
Far from having to fall again into a real [réale] history , a truth that we have gained from this history – scriptural spatiotemporality (whose originality we will soon need to determine) – sanctions and completes the existence of pure transcendental historicity. Without the ultimate objectification that writing permits , all language would as yet remain captive of the de facto and actual intentionality of a speaking subject or community of speaking subjects. By absolutely virtualizing dialogue, writing creates a kind of autonomous transcendental field from which every present subject can be absent .
In connection with the general signification of the epoche, Jean Hyp­polite invokes the possibility of a “subjectless transcendental field ,”one in which “the conditions of subjectivity would appear and where the subject would be constituted starting from the transcendental field. “91
Writing, as the place of absolutely permanent ideal objec­tivities and therefore of absolute Objectivity, certainly constitutes such a transcendental field. And likewise, to be sure, transcendental sub­jectivity can be fully announced and appear on the basis of this field or its possibility. Thus a subjectless transcendental field is one of the ” conditions” of transcendental subjectivity.
But all this can be said only on the basis of an intentional analysis which retains from writing nothing but writing’s pure relation to a consciousness which grounds it as such, and not its factuality which, left to itself, is totally without signification [insignifiante]. For this ab­sence of Subjectivity from the transcendental field, an absence whose possibility frees absolute Objectivity, can be only a factual absence, even if it removed for all time the totality of actual subjects. The origi­nality of the field of writing is its ability to dispense with, due to its sense, every present reading in general . But  if the text  does  not an­nounce its own pure dependence on a writer or reader in general (i  .e. , if it is not haunted by a virtual intentionality) , and if  there is no purely juridical possibility of it being  intel ligible for a transcendental  subject in general , then  there is no more in the vacuity of  its soul than a chaotic literalness  or the sensible opacity of  a defunct  designation, a designation deprived  of  its  transcendental  function. The  silence  of  prehistoric  arcana and buried  civilizations, the entombment of  lost  intentions and  guarded secrets,  and the  illegibility of the  lapidary  inscription  disclose  the transcendental sense of death as what unites these things to the abso­lute  privilege  of  intentionality  in  the  very  instance  of  its  essential juridical failure  [en  ce  qui  l’ unit  a  l’ absolu  du  droit  intentionnel dans l’instance meme de son echec].
When considering the de jure purity of intentional animation, Husserl alway s says that the  linguistic or graphic body is a flesh, a proper body (Leib), or a spiritual  corporeality  (geistige Leiblichkeit)  (FTL,  §2, p. 21).  From then  on,  writing  is  no  longer  only  the  worldly  and mnemotechnical aid to a truth whose own being-sense would dispense with all writing-down. The possibility or necessity of being incarnated in a graphic sign is no longer simply extrinsic and factual in comparison with  ideal Objectivity:  it is the sine qua non  condition of Objectivity’s internal completion. As long as  ideal Objectivity is not , or  rather , can not be engraved  in  the world-as  long as  ideal Objectivity is not  in a position to be party to an incarnation (which, in the purity of  its sense, is more than a system of signals [signalisation]  or an outer garment)­ then  ideal Objectivity  is  not  fully  constituted. Therefore,  the  act  of writing  is  the  highest  possibil ity  of all  “constitution,”  a  fact  against which  the  transcendental  depth  of  ideal  Objectivity’s  historicity  is measured. (…)

All factual writings, in which truth could be sedimented, will never be anything in them­selves but sensible “exemplars ,” individual events in space and time (which is only true to a certain degree for “bound” idealities ). Since truth does not essentially depend on any of them, they could all be destroyed without overtaking the very sense of absolute ideality. Un­doubtedly, absolute ideality would be changed , mutilated, and over­thrown in fact; perhaps it would disappear in fact from the surface of the world, but its sense-of-being as truth, which is not in the world­ neither in our world here, nor any other-would remain intact in itself.»

Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction by Jacques Derrida, p. 87-89, 94.

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«CONCLUSION

63. The task of criticizing transcendental experience and knowledge.

In the investigations of this meditation and already in those of the two preceding meditations, we have been moving within the realm of transcendental experience, of self-experience proper and experience of someone else. We have trusted transcendental experience because of its originarily lived-through evidence; and similarly we have trusted the evidence of predicative description and 1 all the other modes of evidence belonging to transcendental science. Meanwhile we have lost sight of the demand, so seriously made at the beginning namely that an apodictic knowledge, as the only “genuinely scientific” knowledge,2 be achieved; but we have by no means dropped it. Only we preferred / to sketch in outline the tremendous wealth of problems <178> belonging to the first stage of phenomenology a stage which in its own manner is itself still infected with a certain nawete (the naïveté of apodicticity) but contains the great and most characteristic accomplishment of phenomenology, as a refashioning of science on a higher level instead of entering into the further and ultimate problems of phenomenology: those pertaining to its self-criticism, which aims at determining not only the range and limits but also the modes of apodicticity. At least a preliminary idea of the kind of criticism of transcendental-phenomenological knowledge required here is given by our earlier indications of how, for example, a criticism of transcendental recollection discovers in it an apodictic content. All transcendental-philosophical theory of knowledge, as “criticism of knowledge” , leads back ultimately to criticism of transcendental-phenomenological knowledge (in the first place, criticism of transcendental experience); and, owing to the essential reflexive relation of phenomenology to itself, this criticism also demands a criticism. In this connexion, however, there exist no endless regresses that are infected with difficulties of any kind (to say nothing of absurdities), despite the evident possibility of reiterable transcendental reflections and criticisms.»

– Edmund Husserl, “Cartesian Meditations“.